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Over the last decade or so, there has been an explosion in litiga-
tion involving claims that certain pharmaceutical products cause
birth defects. This litigation has dealt a major blow to the contra-
ceptive industry in general, and in particular to efforts to research
and develop a new generation of safer and more effective
contraceptives.
Part I of this Current Topic will discuss litigation involving
spermicides, Bendectin, and birth control pills, and show how that
litigation has inhibited the development of new contraceptives. Part
II will discuss possible solutions to the litigation problem, conclud-
ing that moving to a contract-based no-fault system, which would
include binding arbitration by special science tribunals and a Brit-
ish-style "loser-pays" system, would best discourage unmerited liti-
gation and, concomitantly, encourage pharmaceutical firms to
reenter the contraceptive market.
L The Birth Defect Litigation
Few things in life are more tragic than babies born with severe
birth defects. Unfortunately, such tragedies are not uncommon.
According to a 1986 study, three to six percent of all pregnancies
result in children born with significant defects.' Occasionally, such
defects will be caused by the ingestion of therapeutic drugs by a
woman while pregnant. For example, thousands of European chil-
dren were born with birth defects during the 1960s after their
t The idea for this Current Topic arose from research undertaken by the author on
behalf of the Judicial Studies Project of the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research.
1. Austrian, Expert Evidence in Toxic Tort Litigation, FOR THE DEF., Feb. 18, 1989, at 18.
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mothers took the drug Thalidomide for sleeping disorders. The ex-
amples of Thalidomide and other drugs known to cause birth de-
fects, such as the acne drug Accutane, together with the publicity
surrounding "DES daughters," 2 have led parents of children born
with birth defects to seek an identifiable, man-made cause for their
children's suffering. That quest, combined with some dubious sci-
entific evidence and the prospect of large compensatory and puni-
tive awards, has resulted in lawsuits against manufacturers of
Bendectin, spermicides, and oral contraceptives.
A. Bendectin
In 1957, Merrell Dow introduced Bendectin, a drug designed to
alleviate the symptoms of pregnant women suffering from morning
sickness. Thirty-three million women used the drug during preg-
nancy. Reports began to surface, however, that some women who
had taken Bendectin during pregnancy gave birth to babies with de-
fects similar to those that resulted from the use of Thalidomide.3
Merrell Dow (then known as Richardson-Merrell) soon faced dozens
of lawsuits asking for compensation for injuries allegedly caused by
Bendectin. The first of these, Mekdeci v. Merrell National Laboratories,4
was filed in 1977, and the litigation continues to this day.
According to liability expert Peter Huber, "(t)hroughout [the
Bendectin litigation], the overwhelming scientific consensus, in the
FDA [(Food and Drug Administration)] and in all respectable scien-
tific circles, had not moved an inch: Bendectin does not, in fact,
cause birth defects." 5 Because of that consensus, Merrell Dow has
2. Scientists originally speculated that women whose mothers had taken the female
sex hormone DES during pregnancy might suffer an epidemic of cancer and sterility.
Billions of dollars of claims have been filed against the manufacturers of DES and mil-
lions have been paid out. Fortunately, it seems that the scientists' original projections
were severely overblown, and that DES was not nearly as dangerous as first feared; some
of the alleged victims may have been compensated prematurely. Until the full medical
record is in, it will be hard to say how much of the litigation was justified. But at least in
the case of DES, unlike those that will be discussed below, the general scientific commu-
nity thought at one time that it was dealing with an ultra-hazardous substance. The Medi-
cal Record on DES Emerges After Years of Research and Anxiety, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1989, at
E26.
3. According to defense lawyer Mark Austrian, a National Enquirer article actually re-
ferred to Bendectin as "a new Thalidomide." Austrian, Defense Lawyer's Perspective: Justice
Prevails in Litigation 4 Civ. Trial Manual (BNA) 533, 534 (Jan. 1988).
4. 711 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1983).
5. P. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 102 (1988).
In Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, 649 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd, 857 F.2d
823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 218 (1989),Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson
added: "Though [plaintiff's expert] may disagree, there is now a universal scientific con-
sensus that Bendectin has not been shown to be a teratogen." Id. at 803. According to
defense lawyer Mark Austrian:
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been extremely successful in defending the safety of its product in
court. Ten judges have granted summary judgment motions in
favor of Merrell Dow in Bendectin cases. 6 In another fourteen
cases, trials on the merits resulted in judgments for Merrell Dow. 7
But Merrell Dow has suffered a few losses, as well. In 1983, a
Washington, D.C. jury awarded Mary Oxendine compensatory dam-
ages of $750,000 for her birth defects, which the jury attributed to
her mother's use of Bendectin. At the request of Merrell Dow, pre-
siding D.C. Superior Court Judge Joseph M. Hannon granted a
judgment n.o.v. (notwithstanding the verdict) because he believed
that no jury could reasonably find Dow liable for Oxendine's birth
Numerous peer-reviewed journal articles and medical tests have been published
that review the body of scientific literature on Bendectin. Not one concludes that
Bendectin has been shown to cause birth defects. In addition to the [Food and
Drug Administration], the World Health Organization and numerous health agen-
cies around the world have made official pronouncements that, in their view, the
scientific evidence has not demonstrated an association between Bendectin and
birth defects. Not one government agency has concluded that Bendectin does
cause birth defects.
Austrian, supra note 3, at 534.
6. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. 84-2013-G (IEG) (S.D. Cal.
Nov. 1, 1989) (mem. and order); Ambrosini v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., No. 86-278
(D.D.C. June 30, 1989) (order); Koller v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., No. 80-1258 (D.D.C.
May 30, 1989) (order); De Luca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. 87-226 (GEB)
(D.NJ. May 7, 1989) (mem. and order); Hull v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 700
F. Supp. 28 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Monahan v. Merrell National Laboratories, No. 83-3108-
WD (D. Mass. Dec. 18, 1987) (mem. and order); Lynch v. Merrell National Laboratories,
830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987); Hagle v. Mount Clemens General Hosp., No. 83-3300-
NM (Mich. Cir. Ct. [Macomb Cty.] Nov. 28, 1989); DePyper v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. 83-303-467 NM (Mich. Cir. Ct. [Wayne Cty.] March 10, 1989)
(opinion and order); Thompson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 551 A. 2d 177
(N.J. Super. 1988).
7. Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 218 (1989); Hoffman v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 857 F.2d 290 (6th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 788 (1989); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 874
F.2d 307, reh g en banc denied, 884 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1989); Mekdeci v. Merrell National
Laboratories, 711 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1983); Rudell v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
Inc., No. 85-0115-CV-W-5 (W.D. Mo. June 8, 1988) (order); Hill v. Richardson-Merrell
Inc., No. C83-74TB (W.D. Wash. June 7, 1988) (jury verdict); Hagaman v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. 84-2202-S (D. Kan. June 6, 1988) (jury verdict); Wilson v.
Richardson-Merrell Inc., No. 85-C-540-E (N.D. Okla. Dec. 14, 1987) (order); Rosen v.
Richardson-Merrell Inc., No. 82-0513 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 1987) (jury verdict); Will v.
Richardson-Merrell Inc., 647 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Ga. 1986); Lanzilotti v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. 82-0183 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 1986) (mem. and order)
(WESTLAW); Bityk v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., No. C-302-225, (Super. Ct. Cal. July 1,
1987) (jury verdict); Cordova v. Philips Roxane Labs, Inc., No. 432656, (Super. Ct. Cal.
[Santa Clara Cty.] June 21, 1985) (jury verdict); Cosgrove v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-




defects based on the evidence presented at trial. The plaintiffs ap-
pealed; the D.C. Court of Appeals reversed the trial judge and re-
stored the jury's verdict for the plaintiff.8 The case is still in
litigation.
Soon after the original Oxendine jury verdict, U.S. District Chief
Judge Carl B. Rubin of Cincinnati aggregated the approximately
750 pending Bendectin cases and certified the plaintiffs in those
cases as a class. Without admitting liability, Dow offered to pay
$120 million to the class on the condition that the settlement would
bind all of the plaintiffs. The deal was blocked, however, when the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that Judge Rubin
had exceeded his authority by forbidding plaintiffs who disliked the
settlement offer to opt out of the class. 9
Merrell Dow then withdrew its settlement offer and proceeded to
fight in court with great overall success. Besides Oxendine, Merrell
Dow has lost only two other Bendectin cases. One of those, how-
ever, involved a $95 million judgment, later reduced to $20 mil-
lion. 10 Both cases are presently on appeal.
In 1983, Merrell Dow decided to pull Bendectin off the market
because of the costs of litigation and insurance."l The most imme-
diate victims of the Bendectin litigation (other than Merrell Dow
shareholders) were pregnant women, who lost "their only certifiably
safe relief from sometimes debilitating morning sickness."' 2 Ac-
cording to the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology,
Merrell Dow's decision to discontinue the production of Bendectin
"create[d] a significant therapeutic gap. Nausea and vomiting dur-
ing pregnancy cannot always be treated by symptomatic means, and
in the past year, severe cases have led to serious maternal nutritional
as well as other deficiencies."' 13
In the longer term, contraceptive users have lost, as well. The
Bendectin litigation has caused pharmaceutical companies to shy
8. Oxendine v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., No. 1245-82 (D.C. Super Ct. 1983), rev'd,
Oxendine v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. App. 1986), vacated,
No. 1245-82 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 1988) (mem. order), rev'd, 563 A.2d 330 (D.C.
App. 1989).
9. In re Bendectin Products Liability Litigation, 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984).
10. Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., No. 83-3504 (D.D.C. June 13 1988)
(WESTLAW) (order). The other case is Raynor v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, No. 83-
3506 (D.D.C. May 20, 1987) (jury verdict).
11. Austrian, supra note 3, at 534.
12. P. HUBER, supra note 5, at 162.
13. Board of Trustees of the American Medical Association, Report A-88, Impact of
Product Liability on the Development of New Medical Technologies (Resolution 6, A-87) 11 (1988)
(on file with Yale Law and Policy Review) [hereinafter AMA Report].
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away from products used during and associated with pregnancy and
childbirth. Thus, the Bendectin cases, along with the cases dis-
cussed below, have had a chilling effect on the development of new
contraceptive technology.
B. Oral Contraceptives
The first case alleging a causal relationship between the hormonal
agents in birth control pills and birth defects came in 1973, inJorgen-
sen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories. 14 The plaintiff claimed that her
twins' birth defects were caused by their accidental exposure to
birth control pills while she was pregnant. The trial court dismissed
the case for failure to state a claim, but on appeal the court allowed
the case to proceed to trial.15
In 1977, in response to studies that suggested a possible link be-
tween accidental use of birth control pills during pregnancy and
birth defects,' 6 the FDA began to require oral contraceptive manu-
facturers to warn doctors that progestational agents, contained in
oral contraceptives, should not be used by patients during the first
four months of pregnancy.' 7 Still, no causal relationship between
progestational drugs and birth defects had been established.' 8
By 1988, after more extensive studies had been done, the FDA's
guidelines for oral contraceptive package inserts for patients stated:
There is no conclusive evidence that oral contraceptive use is associ-
ated with an increase in birth defects, when taken inadvertently during
early pregnancy. Previously, a few studies had reported that oral con-
traceptives might be associated with birth defects, but these studies
were not confirmed.i 9
The physician package inserts state:
Extensive epidemiological studies have revealed no increased risk of
birth defects in women who have used oral contraceptives prior to
pregnancy. Studies also do not suggest a teratological effect, particu-
larly insofar as cardiac anomalies and limb reduction defects are con-
cerned, when taken inadvertently during early pregnancy.20
During the intervening years, the relationship between oral con-
traceptives and birth defects was the subject not only of scientific
14. 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973).
15. No further published information is available regarding this case.
16. H. Dorfman,Junk Science and Hormone Birth Defect Litigation: The Role of the
Medical Hypothesis in Product Liability and Regulatory Activities 3-4 (1989) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with Yale Law and Policy Review).
17. Id. at 6.
18. 43 Fed. Reg. 47,178 (Oct. 13, 1978).
19. Quoted in Dorfman, supra note 16, at 7.




inquiry but also of litigation. In Rubenstein v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Co.,21 the plaintiff alleged that her use of oral contraceptives caused
birth defects in her twins. The judge granted summary judgment
for the defendant.
There have also been a few cases related to the birth control pill/
birth defect litigation in which plaintiffs have claimed that synthetic
progesterone prescribed to avert miscarriage caused birth defects.
In Barson v. Squibb, 22 a jury awarded an infant plaintiff whose mother
had used Delalutin, a progestational drug, during pregnancy $1.5
million in compensation for "congenital defects." The Utah
Supreme Court upheld the verdict, 23 despite the growing scientific
consensus that, in the words of an FDA report, "progesterone [and
other hormonal drugs] do not appear to have any significant terato-
genic potential." 24 Later courts were more vigilant. In 1986, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a grant of summary judgment
against a claim that synthetic progesterone caused a pair of twins'
heart problems. 25 And, in a replay of the Barson case, a New Jersey
Superior Court upheld a jury verdict that Delalutin did not cause
Jeremy Zweig's birth defects, and held that the trial court was cor-
rect not to feel bound by the Barson verdict. 26
C. Spermicides
Katie Wells was born on July 1, 1981, with tragic birth defects.
Her mother sued Ortho Pharmaceutical, claiming that the defects
were caused by the company's spermicidal jelly, Ortho-Gynol. She
alleged that the spermicide had damaged but not killed the sperm
that had impregnated her. Despite "overwhelming scientific evi-
dence that contraceptive gels are not teratogenic," 27 Judge Marvin
Shoob, sitting without a jury, found for the plaintiff.28
21. No. CV-80-0177 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1987) (WESTLAW).
22. 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984).
23. Id.
24. This language is from a 1981 FDA Committee report suggesting modifications
to the mandated hormone drug package inserts and warnings. Quoted in Dorfman, supra
note 16, at 7 n.6.
25. Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir. 1986).
26. Zweig v. Squibb, 536 A.2d 1280 (N.J. Super. 1988).
27. AMA Report, supra note 13, at 9. Cf Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links:
The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469,
517 n.244-45 (listing scientific articles rejecting association between spermicides and
birth defects).
28. Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aff'd,
788 F.2d 741, reh'g denied, 795 F.2d 89 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950
(1986).
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Judge Shoob found that the statistical studies offered by experts
at trial were inconclusive as to whether the spermicide caused Katie
Wells' birth defects. But while the defense had presented much
credible evidence that spermicides were safe, the only study pro-
vided by the plaintiff showing a relationship between spermicide use
and birth defects had been reviewed by the FDA and found incon-
clusive. 29 One of the researchers for that study appeared at the trial
to repudiate its use for proving a link between spermicides and birth
defects. Judge Shoob, he said, either did not understand him, or
ignored him. 30
In the end, Shoob based his opinion on his evaluation of the trust-
worthiness of each expert rather than the scientific evidence. The
New York Times pointed out that Ortho's witnesses were prominent
epidemiologists, but, according to Shoob, were gravely lacking in
demeanor and tone. 3' On the other hand, plaintiff's experts, none
of whom had any expertise in epidemiology, had "excellent"
demeanor.3 2
On appeal by Ortho, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals re-
duced the award to $4.7 million but upheld the verdict.33 The court
declared that the plaintiffs were not required to produce scientific
studies showing a statistically significant association between
spermicides and birth defects, nor to defer to two FDA studies find-
ing no link between spermicides and birth defects. 34 The court said
that because Judge Shoob's finding was not "clearly erroneous" it
would not reverse.3 5
Ortho appealed to the Supreme Court, but the Court refused to
hear the case. 36 At the time, Ortho had "less than a handful" of
similar suits pending.37 According to an Ortho lawyer, those suits
"never got anywhere" because the Wells case was such a fluke.3 8
29. ContraceptiveJelly-Birth Defect Study Repudiated by its Authors, United Press Int'l, Dec.
11, 1986 (NEXIS). The FDA had also previously reviewed all the data and concluded
that no warning about possible teratogenicity on spermicide packages was necessary.
AMA Report, supra note 13, at 9.
30. ContraceptiveJelly-Birth Defect Study Repudiated by its Authors, supra note 29.
31. Federal Judges v. Science, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1986, at A22.
32. Id.
33. Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 795 F.2d 89 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 950 (1986).
34. P. HUBER, supra note 5, at 103.
35. Wells, 788 F.2d at 744.
36. Wells, 479 U.S. 950 (1986).





Much to the relief of family planning advocates, 39 the absence of
further successful lawsuits allowed Ortho and other companies to
keep their spermicides on the market. The $4.7 million ruling was
thought to be larger than Ortho's yearly profits from spermicides. 40
A few more successful suits could have driven that product and
other spermicides off the market; the active ingredient in Ortho-Gy-
nol gel is Nonoxynol-9, also used in most other foams, gels, con-
doms, and contraceptive sponges.41
In reaction to Wells, Drs. James Mills and Duane Alexander of the
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development an-
nounced: "The . . . decisions are of great concern to the medical
community because they indicate that the courts will not be bound
by reasonable scientific standards of proof.' 42 The decisions were
of even greater concern to pharmaceutical companies, which bear
the economic costs of such unreasonableness.
D. The Reaction
In 1980, experts writing in International Family Planning Perspectives
predicted that "long-acting hormonal rings, vaginal rings, new in-
jectable preparations, postaglandins to induce early abortions, IUDs
causing less bleeding and pain, and cervical caps are in advanced
field trials with thousands of women, and should be widely available
within the next three to five years. " 4 3 Though some of these products
are now available in Europe, ten years later not one is available in
the United States. No new active ingredients have appeared in the
birth control pills sold in the United States since the 1960s. 4 4 Mean-
while, three new ingredients were introduced in Europe during the
1980s. 4 5 The RU-486 once a month pill, a non-surgical alternative
to traditional abortion, is still unavailable in the United States, de-
spite its availability abroad. No new contraceptive chemical entities
have been introduced in the United States since 1968.46 The United
39. Shortly after the Wells decision, Eve Paul, legal counsel for Planned Parenthood,
said, "It would be a tragedy for women if Ortho-Gynol were to be taken away." Lewin,
Contraceptive Suits a Concern, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1986 at D2, col. 2.
40. Supreme Court Lets Stand Damage Award in Birth Defects Case, Wash. Post, Nov. 11,
1986, at A3.
41. P. HUBER, supra note 5, at 102-103.
42. United Press International, Nov. 6, 1986 (NEXIS).
43. Atkinson, Schearer, Harkavy & Lincoln, Prospects for Improved Contraception, INT'L
FAM. PLAN. PERSP., June 1980, at 43 (emphasis added).
44. Jerassi, The Bitter Pill, 245 SCIENCE 356, 357 (1989).
45. Id.
46. P. HUBER, supra note 5, at 155.
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States was once the leader in contraceptive technology and re-
search. Yet today, contraceptive research has stalled and only one
major company, Ortho Pharmaceutical, continues to invest heavily
in birth control technology.47
Despite the expectations of the past, birth control options in the
United States remain few and unattractive. The greatest victims of
the crisis in contraception are teenage girls and older women. The
United States has the highest teenage pregnancy and teenage abor-
tion rates in the industrialized world. 48 Over one million American
teenagers get pregnant each year,49 making teenage pregnancy one
of America's leading health problems. Women over age thirty-five,
for whom birth control pills pose the greatest health risks, often re-
sort to sterilization, which has a small but significant risk of serious
complications. 50
Many experts allege that the main cause of the contraception cri-
sis is product liability litigation. 5' The litigation detailed above
shows that pharmaceutical companies are not necessarily protected
from expensive litigation even when they manufacture what is
thought by the scientific community to be a safe and effective prod-
uct. This places pharmaceutical companies which might otherwise
wish to explore new birth control alternatives in an especially vul-
nerable position. Causal links between a product and birth defects
are difficult to prove, but are also difficult to disprove, and when
faced with a child stricken with birth defects, jurors and judges
might give otherwise dubious claimants the benefit of the doubt. As
the Bendectin litigation shows, just a few such verdicts can have a
ferocious impact.
Moreover, the manufacturers of Bendectin, birth control pills,
and spermicides were insulated from even greater liability because
their products had been on the market for a long time, and were
therefore able to generate reliable epidemiological studies to back
up their safety claims. Because new products do not have such
records they are more vulnerable to litigation. A bias against new
contraceptive technologies is thus inherent in the system. It is no
47. Phillips, Drug Firms Halting Contraceptive Study, Chi. Trib., Jan. 8, 1989, § 7, at 1.
48. Jerassi, supra note 44, at 358.
49. Connell, The Crisis in Contraception, TECH. REV., May-June 1987, at 47-48.
50. Tubal ligation is often performed under general anesthesia. Id. at 48.
51. One family planning expert says that "product liability has brought contracep-
tive research ... to a screeching halt, and is reducing already available forms of contra-
ceptives." Galen, Birth Control Options Limited by Litigation: Whose Fault is it?, NAT'L L.J.,
Oct. 20, 1986, at 1. See also Jerassi, supra note 44, at 357; Phillips, supra note 47;




wonder that the president of a large pharmaceutical company asks,
"[w]ho in their right mind would work on a product today that
would be used by pregnant women?" 52
II. Solutions
A. Judicial Control of Scientific Evidence
Some judges have made valiant efforts to separate "junk science"
from legitimate scientific claims in trials involving birth defect cau-
sation claims. After some initial setbacks, 53 the momentum clearly
seems to be on the side of those judges who insist on strictly scruti-
nizing the evidence that comes before them.
As mentioned above,54 D.C. trial court Judge Hannon granted a
judgment n.o.v. to the defense in an early Bendectin case. Unfortu-
nately, that decision was overruled. 55 Judge Thomas Penfield Jack-
son was more successful in Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell. He
banned the plaintiffs from presenting any statistical or scientific evi-
dence absent a showing of statistical significance. 56 When the jury
returned with a verdict for the plaintiffs in the amount of
$1,160,000, Judge Jackson granted a motion for a judgment n.o.v.
in favor of the defendant. 57 On plaintiff's appeal, a unanimous
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia upheld Judge Jackson's decision, finding that the plaintiffs
had not carried their evidentiary burden. 58 In a rare show of
ecumenicism on the D.C. Circuit, the opinion ofJudge Robinson, a
liberal, was joined by two conservative members of the D.C. Circuit,
Judges Laurence Silberman and Douglas Ginsburg. The Supreme
Court refused to hear the case on appeal. 59
52. Huber, Litigation Thwarts Innovation in the U.S., Sci. AM:, March 1989, at 120.
53. See, e.g., Lanzilotti v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, No. 82-0183 (E.D. Pa. July
10, 1986) (mem. and order) (WESTLAW) (judge denied defendant's motion for directed
verdict in Bendectin case); Ramirez v. Richardson-Merrell, No. 85-1504 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
4, 1986) (mem. and order) (WESTLAW) (judge denied plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment in Bendectin case). The Ramirez plaintiffs later withdrew their claim with
prejudice.
54. Supra note 7 and accompanying text.
55. Supra note 8 and accompanying text.
56. Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, No. 83-3505 (D.D.C. June 9, 1986) (order).
See also Koller v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., No. 80-1258, mem. op. at I (D.D.C. Feb. 25,
1983) (statistical confidence level of 95% needed for admittance).
57. Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 649 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1986).
58. Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
59. Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 218 (1989).
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In the In re Bendectin class action case, 60 Judge Rubin banned the
word "Thalidomide" and visibly deformed children from the court-
room to prevent the plaintiffs from playing on the jury's fears and
sympathies. He also "trifurcated" the trial, asking the jurors first to
decide whether Bendectin caused birth defects. If they had an-
swered "yes," a second trial would have followed to determine lia-
bility, and then a third to determine damages. This was to prevent a
situation in which damages could be awarded out of sympathy with-
out a finding of causation. 6 1 After listening to nineteen experts, the
jury found that Bendectin did not cause the birth defects, making
the issue of liability moot. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals up-
held that verdict despite challenges to Rubin's unorthodox meth-
ods. 6 2 The plaintiffs made a final appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court,
but the Court let the verdict for the defense stand.63
Another Bendectin case, Lynch v. Merrell-National Laboratories, 64 be-
came a powerful precedent for judges to exclude expert scientific
evidence that had not been subject to rigorous peer review, 65 as well
as testimony regarding human birth defects based on studies of ani-
mals. In proceedings below, the trial court had granted summary
judgment for the defense on both causation and collateral estoppel
grounds. If the collateral estoppel decision had been upheld, it
could have set a precedent barring all future Bendectin claims. The
appeals court overturned the grant of estoppel, though it upheld the
summary judgment ruling on the causation issue. 66
The plaintiffs' case in Lynch had been based on a reanalysis by Dr.
Shanna Swan of the data used in a study conducted by the Center
for Disease Control [CDC]. Dr. Swan came to a different conclusion
than the CDC, but the court rejected her conclusions, writing:
Swan's study has never been refereed or published in a scientific jour-
nal or elsewhere. We are informed of it only by the defendant's ex-
cerpts. On the basis of what we have, it could not form the foundation
60. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prod. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D.
Ohio 1985), af'd, 857 F. 2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 788 (1989).
61. This happened at the trial level in Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat'l Laboratories, N. 77-
225-ORL-CIV-Y (M.D. Fla., Mar. 21, 1980) (jury verdict). The trial court then ordered a
retrial, which was won by the defendants and upheld on appeal. See Mekdeci, 711 F.2d
1510 (11th Cir. 1983).
62. In re Richardson-Merrell, 857 F. 2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988).
63. 109 S. Ct. 788 (1989).
64. 646 F. Supp. 856 (D. Mass. 1986).
65. See also Brock, 874 F.2d at 313 ("courts must ... be especially skeptical of medical
and other scientific evidence that has not been subjected to thorough peer review.").
66. Lynch v. Merrell-National Laboratories, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987). The
court pointed out that in an "opt-out" case, Judge Rubin himself refused to give estop-




for an expert opinion challenging the scientific consensus and making
the issue of causation a factual question to be decided by the jury. 6 7
Moreover, the Lynch appeals court also upheld the trial court's ex-
clusion of in vivo and in vitro animal studies and studies of "chemi-
cally analogous drugs," because these studies were not of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts on the causation of birth defects.
Most recently, in Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 6 8 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a jury verdict in favor of a
Bendectin plaintiff. The court held that "unproven medical specula-
tion lacking any sort of consensus," such as plaintiff's case in Brock,
has no probative value. 69 In denying a petition for rehearing, the
court warned that judges should "be especially vigilant in scrutiniz-
ing the basis, reasoning and statistical significance" of epidemiologi-
cal studies. 70
Unfortunately, extreme vigilance by judges is not always enough.
If an "expert" of dubious expertise is theatrically skilled and persis-
tent, she may well be able to fool even conscientious judges and
jurors, who, because of their general ignorance of scientific tech-
nique, are susceptible to well-presented quackery. The frustration
judges feel in having to police the scientific profession was summed
up by Judge Glasser in Rubinstein v. Ortho.7 1 Disturbed by what he
considered to be a lack of professional ethics on the part of some
witnesses at the trial, Judge Glasser thundered:
Perhaps the time has come for a vigorous discussion and examination
of the problem by professional schools, bar associations and learned
societies with a view towards re-examining the criteria for qualifying
an expert witness and developing stringent protocols and ethical
guidelines by which the testimony of such witness may be governed. 72
B. The FDA
Because of the difficulties involved in requiring judges and juries
to sort through contradictory expert scientific testimony, some ob-
servers have advocated removing the process from the tort system
completely. One suggested approach would give the FDA sole and
67. Id. at 1195. But see Rudell v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. 85-0115-CV-
W-5 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 19, 1987) ("The jury can decide how much credence to give to any
or all of the reports.").
68. 874 F.2d 307, petition for reh 'g denied, 884 F.2d 166, reh g en banc denied, 884 F.2d
167 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
69. Id. at 316.
70. 884 F.2d at 166.
71. No. CV-80-0177 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (WESTLAW).
72. Id.
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final responsibility to determine which products are safe and may be
marketed.73 FDA approval would immunize products from suit by
alleged victims.
While theoretically plausible, this solution suffers from practical
problems. The FDA, like other regulatory agencies, is prone to
"capture" by the interests it is supposed to regulate. Companies
with the right political connections might convince the FDA to look
the other way as they introduced unsafe products, in the same way
that some members of the Savings and Loan. industry used their
congressional allies to prevent an early investigation into their
fraudulent and reckless practices. 74' Victims of drugs that came to
market in such a manner would. be as. legally helpless against the
drug companies as taxpayers are against the S&Ls.
While the FDA might be lax.in some cases, it is perhaps even
more likely to be too cautious overall. Already, along with the liabil-
ity situation, the FDA's cumbersome, expensive and time-consum-
ing approval process is cited as a major factor in discouraging
contraceptive research. 75 The reason behind the FDA's overcau-
tiousness is clear: if the agency allows a drug such as Thalidomide to
be marketed without being absolutely certain of its safety, the
agency will be blamed for its sin of commission if the product causes
harm. If, on the other hand, the FDA delays the approval of a safe
drug, the victims of its sin of omission are invisible and the agency
suffers few repercussions.7 6
If the FDA had sole authority to determine the safety of drugs,
and victims had no legal recourse, the agency would be pressured to
make its approval process even stricter and more Byzantine. Such a
turn of events would further curtail contraceptive research and
development. 77
73. See Olson,Judge Bork, Contraceptives, and Liability Reform, Manhattan Inst. for Pol'y
Res. Civ. Just. Memo 3 (Sept. 22, 1987) (judges should defer to the FDA in deciding
whether a product is safe).
74. See, e.g., Carlson $1 Billion Worth of Influence: How a Shaky Businessman Put Five
Senators in His Corner, TIME, Nov. 6, 1989, at 27.
75. Jerassi, supra note 44, at 357; Hansen, States News Service, July 20, 1989
(NEXIS).
76. This situation is changing with the development of a large, vocal gay community
which has pressured the FDA to change its procedures in the case of AIDS drugs. See,
e.g., Groopman, Rxfor the FDA: Breaking the Drug Approval Loeam, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 13,
1989, at 17 (gay activists have teamed with traditional "right-wing" advocates of reform
to form a powerful coalition in favor of overhauling the current drug approval process).
77. Some critics might argue that there is no such thing as "overdeterrence" when it
comes to preventing birth defects, and that it is perhaps worth limiting women's repro-
ductive options in order to prevent such tragedies. But the availability of safe and effec-





The best way to attack the birth defect litigation crisis is not to
have a solution imposed from above, but to allow the marketplace to
solve the problem through contract. Peter Huber has suggested re-
placing the tort system in birth defect cases with a system of "neo-
contract. ' 78 Manufacturers of products used by pregnant women,
such as the products discussed above, would include an insurance
package with every dose of their product. The company would
agree to pay, for example, $1 million per birth defect caused by its
product. In return, the purchaser would agree in advance not to
sue. The expense of the tort system would be replaced by a rela-
tively efficient "no-fault" system.
This proposal works well when applied to situations in which the
chains of causation are relatively clear. In such cases, compensation
must be paid in any event, and neo-contract is the most efficient way
of delivering the compensation. But the main problem in the litiga-
tion discussed in this Current Topic is that providers of products
used by pregnant women must engage in expensive litigation over
birth defect claims against products that are safe and effective and
could not have caused the alleged injury.
If Huber's proposal were applied unmodified to that litigation, a
no-fault system would have to be established through which all ba-
bies born with birth defects could be compensated for their injuries
by pharmaceutical companies. Since three to six percent of all ba-
bies are born with severe birth defects, giving contraceptive or
Bendectin purchasers carte blanche to receive compensation if their
babies are born with injuries would quickly either bankrupt the pro-
ducers or put the price of the product well out of the reach of the
average consumer.
However, Huber's proposal could be modified slightly to avoid
this problem. His proposal for ex ante agreement to compensate in-
jured children for the defects they suffer could be combined with a
stipulation that the company and parents of the alleged victim sub-
mit to arbitration before a panel of "judges" knowledgeable about
the issue at hand to determine whether the birth defects were more
Current Topic (supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text), older women and teenagers
are especially victimized by the contraceptive crisis. These women also give birth to a
higher percentage of babies with birth defects than other women. By limiting the availa-
bility of contraceptives, overdeterrence by the FDA would probably lead to a large in-
crease in the number of babies born with birth defects.
78. P. HUBER, supra note 5, at 196-97. See id. at 190-206 for a broad discussion of
"neo-contractual" solutions to tort problems.
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probably than not caused by the product. In cases where the evi-
dence was as yet inconclusive, the panel could require the company
to put aside in a trust enough assets, either in cash or in insurance
policies, to pay the claim in the future. If it turned out that the
product was safe and effective, the assets would revert to the
company.
Selection of an expert panel in a manner agreeable to both parties
is problematic. A system similar to jury selection, with each side
being allowed to veto prospective judges, might solve the problem.
A clause added to the contract requiring both sides to be "reason-
able" in using the veto power would make refusal by either party to
accept acknowledged scientific experts grounds for a breach of con-
tract suit. A British-style "loser pays" system would discourage friv-
olous litigation over this issue. 79
The proposal outlined above is not intended to describe the exact
contours of the contracts that would evolve if ex ante contract were
adopted. Innovation among producers in a competitive market situ-
ation would lead to a more efficient system of settling birth defect
litigation through contract than anything a "central planner" such
as the author of this Current Topic could invent.80
The major barrier to implementation of some type of neocontrac-
tual program is the American legal system's current hostility to con-
tractual solutions to tort issues.8' Contracts between individuals
and large companies are routinely voided on the grounds of "une-
qual bargaining power," "unconscionability," "public policy" and
other such judicial doctrines. If companies tried to avoid liability to
true victims of defective products through neocontract, the courts
almost certainly would refuse to enforce those contracts in an effort
to protect the rights of assumedly ignorant consumers. But if the
contracts guaranteed significant and fair compensation to victims
who could trace their injuries to oral contraceptives or morning
sickness medication in a scientifically acceptable manner, then the
79. See infra § III(D).
80. See generally F. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1989)
(major error of many modern thinkers is their desire to plan the economy from above
using inherently limited human reason and knowledge rather than letting the greatest
repository of economic knowledge, the free market, make economic decisions).
81. See infra § III(D). See generally, P. HUBER, supra note 5; G. GILMORE, THE DEATH
OF CONTRACT (1974). Walter Olson of the Manhattan Institute points out the irony in
the fact that at about the same time the Supreme Court guaranteed the right to use
contraception in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), other judicial decisions
were eviscerating the traditional distinction between tort and contract law, with the re-
sult that available contraceptive technology has barely progressed. Personal communi-




only people who could reasonably object would be the products lia-
bility bar, which collects a large portion of the money presently
spent on toxic tort suits.
D. Loser Pays
Whether or not a neocontractual solution is adopted, the current
fee system should be replaced with a British style "loser pays" sys-
tem. 8 2 Such a rule would preserve the ability of impoverished plain-
tiffs to acquire legal assistance, but only if their lawyers thought they
had a respectable chance to win.8 3 Currently, because there is no
penalty when they lose a case except for wasted time and effort,
plaintiffs' lawyers have every incentive to file dozens of lawsuits
against safe and effective products in the hopes of winning one or
two huge judgments, or of coercing a large settlement from a com-
pany seeking to avoid the costs and negative publicity of protracted
litigation. 84
III. Conclusion
The results of our current system are quite clear - a few random
plaintiffs and their lawyers share hundreds of thousands, even mil-
lions, of dollars. Meanwhile, others do without new contraceptive
technologies, and old, safe technologies such as Bendectin are no
longer available to those who need them. Under the system I pro-
pose, the spermicide, Bendectin, and oral contraceptive litigation
would have been settled ex ante by contract and never reached the
courtroom. It is unlikely that the manufacturers of these products
would have paid out any money in claims, and litigation costs would
have been minimal. Yet, true victims of genuinely unsafe products,
82. For more on fee-shifting and related issues, see Katz, Measuring the Demand for
Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?, 3 J. LAw EcON. & ORG. 143 (1987); Priest,
Regulating the Content and Volume of Litigation: An Economic Analysis, I SuP. CT. EcON. REV.
163 (1982); Shavell, Suit Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods
for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11. Legal Studies 55 (1982); 47J. LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
(Winter 1984) (special issue on fee-shifting).
83. Indeed, a loser-pays system might even enhance the opportunities of true vic-
tims, as the losing party could be forced to pay the other side's experts' fees. Currently,
some valid but not overly remunerative claims are not brought because the plaintiffs'
lawyers do not want to expend large sums of unrecoverable money on experts. In such
cases, the company that caused the damage knows that it can escape liability for the
injuries it caused if it refuses to settle.
84. A perfect example of this phenomenon is the protracted Bendectin litigation,
which Merrell Dow offered to settle for $120 million, and through which a few plaintiffs
and their attorneys have won millions of dollars in judgments while the rest have left the
courtroom empty-handed. See supra notes 3-13 and accompanying text.
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such as Thalidomide and the Dalkon Shield, would receive a prede-
termined compensatory award, without one-third or more of their
compensation being swallowed by the legal community.
Creative contractual solutions to the contraception crisis such as
the one outlined in this essay would permanently solve a judicially
created problem. But as long as the courts remain hostile to con-
tract and companies remain too timid to test neocontract, we will
have to rely on a combination of judicial wisdom and professional
ethics. Unfortunately, while most judges are wise and most paid ex-
perts honest, those qualities are not always present. And Ameri-
cans, especially women of child-bearing age, are paying the price.
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